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Royalist in Transition: Facundo
Melgares, the Last Spanish Governor of
New Mexico, 1818-1822
ARTHUR GOMEZ

In August 1818 Viceroy Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, the Conde de Venadito,
received documents written by an anonymous visitor to New Mexico. These
papers, intercepted by Spanish ambassador to the United States, Luis de
Onis, revealed startling observations about Spain's northernmost province
that caused grave concern among ruling authorities regarding the state of
military preparedness along the northern frontier.
Written in French, the notes were the observations of a military expert
who had visited New Mexico some time during the summer of 1817. A summary of the report referenced the vulnerability of the province:
I consider New Mexico, in its .present position, as one of the most
vulnerable points ofthe Provincias Internas, and because of the facility of communication by land with the United States ... as one ofthe
most advantageous for insurgents....
More alarming to the viceroy than this declaration of New Mexico's strategic weakness was the implication that only a poprly armed militia, commanded by incompetent officers, protected its borders. I
The critical tenor of these remarks doubtless gave Viceroy Ruiz de
Apodaca cause for concern. Not only did the document call the efficiency
of New Mexico military leaders into question, but it raised serious doubts
about the overall defensive capability in one of the northernmost provinces
of New Spain, Among the numerous responsibilities expected of a frontier
official, maintenance of security and protection ofits inhabitants was unquesArthur Gomez earned his doctorate in history at the University of New Mexico. He is
currently a historian for the Southwest Regional Office of the National Park Service.
1. "Notes Concerning the Provinces of New Mexico Collected on My Mission West,"
in Alfred B. Thomas, ed., "An Anonymous Description of New Mexico, 1818, " Southwest Quarterly ReView, 33 (July 1929),64-66; Historians have speculated as to the identity
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tionably paramount. In New Mexico, that charge fell directly upon the newly
appointed magistrate, Lieutenant Colonel Facundo Melgares, gentleman of
the Order of San Hermenegildo, inspector of the standing army, and governor of the province.
Like most crown officials of his day, Melgares was a member of the
Spanish upper class. Born in 1775 in Villa Carabaca, Murcia, Spain, Melgares
reaped the benefits offormal education and military training afforded only
the nobility. A family of considerable social standing in Spain, the Melgares
name was highly regarded in the New World as well. One of Facundo's
uncles presided as judge ofthe Audiencia of New Spain. Moreover, the young
second lieutenant married into an influential military family. His father-inlaw, Lieutenant Colonel Alberto Maynez, a future governor of New Mexico,
was at the time of Melgares' arrival to the New World adjutant to the commandant general of the Provincias Internas de Occidente, headquartered in
Chihuahua. For this reason, Lieutenant Melgares inaugurated his military
career in New Spain not in the comforts of Mexico City as one might have
expected, but in the astringent surroundings of the northern frontier.
A second lieutenant in the king's royal army in 1803, Melgares initiated
a standard ten~year enlistment at the presidio of San Fernando de Carrizal,
located seventy-five miles south of EI Paso del Norte. Like most frontier
soldiers, he gained combat seasoning through numerous encounters with
Apaches, whose incessant raiding upon settlements along the Rio Grande
threatened the security of the Spanish frontier. 2
Proving himself one of Commandant General Nemesio Salcedo's most
capable officers, Melgares appeared in Santa Fe for the first time in command of a contingent of sixty well-equipped troops. His mission was ostensibly to make a show of force in order to suppress recalcitrant Pawnees,
of the observer. Ramon Ruiz suggests it may have been Jules DeMun, a trapper known to
have visited New Mexico about this time; see, Ramon Eduardo Ruiz, "For God and Counry: A Brief History of Spanish Defensive Efforts Along the North.eastern Frontier of New
Mexico," (master's thesis, Claremont Graduate School, 1948), 146. Another scholar, however, identifies the observer as Lieutenant Colonel Louis DeMun, brother of Jules, who
was assigned by the French government to reconnoiter New Mexico, Donald A. Nuttall,
"The American Threat to New Mexico, 1804-1822," (master's thesis, San Diego State
College, 1959), 181.
2. Thomas Bolkan, "Facundo Melgares and the Northern Frontier of New Spain,"
(master's thesis, University of New Mexico, 1965), 4-10; Facundo Melgares personally
related his combat experience against Apaches in, Zebulon M. Pike, Explorations to the
Source of the Mississippi in 1805 through the Territory ofLouisiana and the Provinces
ofNew Spain in 1806-1807 (Denver: W. H. Lawrence and Co., 1889),261.
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who had recently attacked a Spanish reconnaissance party.3 Melgaresresponded to the entreaty of New Mexico Governor Joaquin del Real
Alencaster, arriving in the provincial capital on May 30, 1806. While on this
temporary assignment, Facundo Melgares participated in an episode of international intrigue that would link his name to American frontier military
history for all time.
)
With the United States acquisition of the Louisiana Territory from France
in 1803, Spain's uncontested dominion in the borderlands became seriously
jeopardized. Indeed, the Anglo-Americans wasted no time in presenting a
challenge to Spain concerning the delineation of the southwestern boundary that separated the two imperialistic countries. In his effort to determine
the extent of territory acquired from France, expansionist President Thomas Jefferson requested Congress to appropriate funds sufficient to outfit
an exploratory mission into Louisiana Territory. "Extending the external
commerce of the U.S.," was Jefferson's justification for the expenditure.
Under the command of Meriwether Lewis, the president's private secretary,
and a military assistant, William Clark, the expedition departed S1. Louis,
Missouri, on May 14, 1804, with explicit i.nstructionsto "infiltrate Spanish
borders whenever necessary". 4
Anticipating the United States to send exploration parties into disputed
territory, Spanish officials ordered the northeastern periphery of its empire
reconnoitered to circumvent any foreign intrusion. Forewarned of the in- '
tent of the Lewis and Clark expedition, General Salcedo attended to the
urgently worded message from the Marques Sebastian Calvo de la Puerta y
O'Farril of New Orleans, who warned of the impending intrusion. Salcedo
forwarded Calvo's dispatch to then Governor Fernando de Chacon advising that he increase vigilance along New Mexico's borders.
'.
The message, dated May 3, 1804, instructed Chacon to arrest Captain
"Merry," who was certain to cross into Spanish territory. The commandant
general further instructed Chacon to secure the allegiance of neighboring
Indian tribes, and to send out reconnaissance parties to determine the exact
location of the foreigners. Finally, Salcedo advised his subordinate to employ Pedro Vial, a reputable frontiersman with first hand knowledge of the
border region, to head the reconnaissance mission. Two days after Lewis
and Clark departed S1. Louis, Governor Chacon confirmed the Anglo-American approach toward New Mexico to his superiors in Chihuahua. Two
Apaches, recently arrived in Santa Fe, informed the governor that Captain
"Merry" of the United States was exploring the upper reaches of the Missouri River. 5
3. The reconnaissance party was that of Pedro Vial and Jose Jarvet discussed in greater
detail below, see, Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide ofEmpire: Spain and the PaCific Northwest. 1543-1819 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973),477.
4. Governor Fernando Chacon to General Nemesio Salcedo, Santa Fe, May 16, 1804,
in Spanish Archives ofNew MexiCO, 1621 -1 821, frame 1730, reel 15, New Mexico State
Records Center and Archives (NMSRCA), Santa Fe, New Mexico.
5. Ibid., 446·57; Vial gained his intimate knowledge of the Red River region in 1787
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In compliance with the general's mandate, Chacon ordered Pedro Vial
and Jose Jarvet , a soldier-interpreter with a long standing familiarity among
the Pawnees, to reconnoiter the area north of the province to ascertain information about the Americans. Vial's group left Santa Fe on August 1,1804,
following the Rio Las Animas Perdidas en el Purgatario (Purgatoire) to the
Napestle (Arkansas) Valley. They turned northeast and followed the Rio
Chato (Platte) into present-day Nebraska. After Vial failed to confirm the
presence of the Lewis and Clark expedition, he turned to his second objective: to secure the loyalty ofthe Pawnees as well as other neighboring tribes
to Spain. Crucial to the maintenance offrontier security was the assurance
that the Indians remain loyal in the face of Anglo-American pressure to sway
them. General Salcedo rightly feared that the intruders would exert every
pressure to undermine Spanish-Indian alliances on the frontier. Confident
of Comanche loyalty, but still skeptical of Pawnee fidelity, Salcedo concentrated his efforts in the north and easi. In keeping with Salcedo's policy,
Vial escorted Pawnee chiefs back to Santa Fe, where they received gifts from
the governor and pledged the oath of allegiance to the crown. 6
A second Vial-Jarvet mission followed in October 1805; however, it met
with considerably less success than the first. Chacon's successor, Joaquin
del Real Alencaster, suspected foreign influence among the Pawnees when
they failed to return to Santa Fe for their annual trade visit. Three weeks
after Vial and Jarvet left Santa Fe, approximately one hundred Indians, identified as either Pawnees or Kiowas, attacked the reconnaissance party. Caught
by surprise and substantially outnumbered, the Spaniards had no recourse
but to abort the mission and return to the capital. 7
The governor attributed the debacle to increasing American influence
over neighboring Indian tribes. Vial advised his superiors that future reconnaissance parties must be larger and better equipped to be effective. He recommended further that the governor commission a fort be built on the Arkansas River that could serve both as a staging area to protect against American encroachment, and as a base from which to trade with the Indians. In
light of the attack on Vial, and his suspicion that the Pawnees may have
defected to the American cause, Alencaster summoned reinforcements from
Chihuahua. Furthermore, the governor informed General Salcedo of his plan
to dispatch yet another reconnaissance mission into Pawnee territory. At
this juncture, Lieutenant Melgares arrived from the presidio of Carrizal with
additional troops and instructions from Salcedo not only to encounter any
American interlopers, but to "drive them back, or capture and take them to
Santa Fe."8
when Governor Domingo Cabello of Texas commissioned him to establish an overland
route from San Antonio to Santa Fe.
6. Cook, Flood Tide, 462-65.
7. Cook, Flood Tide, 462-69; Abraham P. Nasatir, Borderland in Retreat: From Spanish LOUisiana to the Far Southwest (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976),
140-41; Nuttall, "The American Threat to New Mexico," 70.
8. Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, December 25, 1805, frame 1937, reel 15; also,
January 4, 1806, frame 1942, reel 15, NMSRCA.
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This reference to Salcedo's directive represents the first documented
evidence to suggest that the principal military objective of Facundo Melgares
in 1806 was not to intercept Zebulon Pike as historians have traditionally
assumed. Indeed, the Spanish officer may have set out for New Mexico to
intercept the Thomas Freeman and Peter Custis expedition, known to be in
the area in search of the source of the Red River (mistakenly thought to be
located near Santa Fe). On the other hand, Melgares may have been in pursuit of William Dunbar, whom Jefferson had ordered to the westernmost
fringe of Louisiana. While the Dunbar mission apparently had no direct relationship to the Lewis and Clark venture, Spanish officials were convinced
that this was a deliberate attempt by the American president to divert their
attention from "Captain Merry."9
Spanish concern about foreign encroachment was not unfounded. During recent months, events had occurred along the disputed international
boundary to validate their suspicions about American intent. First, armed
American troops forced the Spanish garrison at Los Adaes, near the present
Texas-Louisiana border, to relinquish their post. Concurrently, President
Jefferson, in a special message to Congress in March 1806, warned of the
possibility of war with Spain over frontier incidents. In a dispatch~o Texas
Governor Antonio Cordero, Salcedo expressed his uneasiness over the developing situation along the border:
They [the Americans) are also massing troops without question of
expense to hold by force their spoils. They are intriguing with the
Indians, have built a storehouse at Natchitoches, and have fiJIed it
with gifts for them. It has not been possible for us to oppose them in
force, but in order to counteract their influence among the Indians I
have despatched [sic) expeditions to the various tribes.... 10 .

,.,
.

Historian Warren Cook argues convincingly in Flood Tide of Empire
that Facundo Melgares received his orders to march north well in advance
of Zebulon Pike's departure from Missouri. Furthermore, the Melgares expedition, according to Cook, was "too ponderous to have been outfitted
and dispatched on a moment's notice." This clearly would not have been
the case if his Objective was to intercept Pike; who left St. Louis in July of
1806 (Melgares departed Santa Fe on June 15). Finally, there is no evidence
to prove Salcedo had advance warning of Pike's foray into Spanish territory
before he ordered Melgares to New Mexico.
9. Salcedo to Casa Clavo, Chihuahua, April 12, 1806, frame 1856, reel 16, NMSRCA;
Warren Cook is among the earliest historians to revise the long-held notion that Melgares
was searching specifically for Zebulon Pike. He explains the expedition to New Mexico
as "a combined expedition to the Red River and the Pawnee country." Cook, Flood Tide
ofEmpire, 446-90; for a more recent opinion, see, David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier
in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 294, 462n.
10. Cook. Flood Tide. 476.
.
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Thus, it was merely coincidence that Facundo Melgares entered the Arkansas VaHey just months before Pike's arrival. It is not surprising, however, that the two parties did not engage one another since Lieutenant
Melgares was probably never looking for Pike. In fact, after Lewis and Clark's
triumphant return to St. Louis on September 23, 1806, ,Spanish authorities
were embarrassed by their failure to abort the mission. Spain had a compelling reason to hide Melgares' objectives, Cook argues, behind the readymade excuse of Pike's coming. 11
.
That Melgares was prepared to carry out his orders from General Salcedo
is indisputable. He may have been surprised, however, when informed about
additional duties awaiting him once he arrived at the presidio of Santa Fe.
At the last minute, Governor Real Alencaster assigned the young lieutenant
to complete Pedro Vial's mission, which had failed for a 'third time because
of desertion and mutiny among the militia enlistees and Indian auxiliaries.
Melgares accepted his new task with all the pageantry worthy of his affiuent
life style. He amassed the largest expeditionary force to penetrate the northern plains since the days of Juan Bautista de Anza. Adding forty-five army
regulars from the presidio of Santa Fe to the sixty men he brought with him
from Chihuahua, Melgares recruited another four hundred local militia and
one hundred Indian allies. Each regular was equipped with two horses, one
mule, and six month's provisions. 12
The governor's instructions stressed three objectives: first, descend the
Red River and engage the American intruders; second, explore the region
from New Mexico to the Missouri River; and third, visit the Pawnees to
negotiate a treaty in which they must agree to prevent American passage
through their lands. Melgares fulfilled the latter directive through his encounter wi th several Pawnee chiefs, convincing them to enter into a formal
agreement with Spain. At this point, Melgares divided his troops, taking a
smaller contingent to visit outlying camps. He informed the Indians offuture visits and revealed Salcedo's plan to build a fort on the Arkansas. Unable to verify signs offoreign encroachment, and convinced he had secured
the Pawnees' loyalty, Melgares arrived back in Santa Fe on October 1, 1806.
Meanwhile, on September 1, Lieutenant Zebulon Pike entered the same
Pawnee village that the Spaniards had visited just months before. As promised, the Indians tried to turn the Americans back, but without success. Instead, the party followed the Rio Grande (which Pike later testified he mistook for the Red River) toward New Mexico. The column camped near the
11. Cook, Flood Tide, 481-82. Pike apparently believed himself to be the object of
Melgares' search; see, Donald Jackson, ed., The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike,
With Letters and Related Documents, 2 vols., (Norman, Oklahoma, 1966), 1:323-24; Although Melgares nearly chanced to encounter the Pike expedition near. a Pawnee village
on the Republican River in present southern Nebraska, the Spaniard instead made a broad
sweep of the plains in search of the known Freeman-Custis expedition; see, Weber, Spanish Frontier in North America, 294.
12. Salcedo to Alencaster, Chihuahua, May 30; July 18, 1806, frame 2001, reel 16,
NMSRCA, refers to the desertions and Vial's third mission; a later document refers to the
trial of the deserters, Alencaster to Salcedo, Santa Fe, June 16, 1807, frame 2058, reel
16, NMSRCA.
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north face of the Sangre de Cristos, which Pike erroneously believed fonned
a natural barrier between Spanish and American territory. In January 1807,
the Americans crossed the snow-eovered range-less than one hundred miles
northwest of Taos-into Spanish domain. It was here that Pike ordered his
men to build a small stockade on the Conejos River, a western tributary of
the Rio Grande. 13
Reaction from the governor of New Mexi.co was swift and effective. In
late February, he despatched Lieutenants Ignacio Saltelo and Bartolome
Fernandez to inform the Americans of their error. Saltelo's instructions were
not to engage the intruders; rather, he was to provide Pike's snow-bound
party with mules, horses, money, or whatever he [Pike] required to depart
the territory. Once the Spaniards rescued the Americans, they escorted them
to Santa Fe as instructed to meet with Governor Real Alencaster. The exhausted and shivering contingent arrived in the provincial capital on March
3,1807. 14
Assuring the foreigners that they were technically not under arrest, the
governor ordered that they be escorted to Chihuahua to discuss the purpose
of their expedition to the Spanish frontier with Commandant General
Nemesio Salcedo. It was on this journey to military headquarters in Chihuahua, that Zebulon Pike first encountered his Spanish counterpart. On
March 8, Melgares' troops, who left the village of San Fernandez, met the
military escort led by Captain Antonio de Almansa. It appears that from the
moment of his arrival, the junior-grade officer made a positive impression
on Pike, which remained with him for years to come.
The two soldiers spent several days discussing personal and military /
matters. Their daiiyassociation inspired the American to write this assessment ofMelgares to his commanding officer:
Melgares possesses none of the haughty Castillian pride, but much
of the urbanity of Frenchmen; and I will add my feeble testimony of
his loyalty by declaring that he was one of the few officers or citizens
whom I found who were loyal to their king, who felt indignant at the
degraded state of the Spanish monarch, who deprecated a revolution
or separation ~f Spanish America from the mother country, unless
France should usurp the government of Spain. ls
Pike also wrote aletter to Real Alencaster endorsing the governor's confidence in the lieutenant as a "gentleman and a soldier." The American off13. The official purpose of the Pike mission in 1806 remains unclear. Most historians
believe that Pike's orders came directly from then governor of Louisiana, General James
B. Wilkinson, suspected of plotting an invasion of New Mexico; see, Donald Jackson,
"How Lost Was Pike?" American Heritage 16 (February 1965), 10-15, 75-80; Weber,
The Spanish Frontier in North America, 294-95; Nuttall, "American Threat to New
Mexico," 85-86.
14. Ralph Emerson Twitchell, The Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 5 ·vols.,
(Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 1911-1917), 3 :466.
15. Pike, Explorations, 259.
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icer had little criticism of his captor except to say that he was self-indulgent
as evidenced by the luxurious manner in which Melgares traveled. Pike also
observed the lieutenant to be overbearing with his own troops, but qualified
this censure by insisting Melgares was quite popular with the local civilian
population. 16
On one occasion, Melgares related a story to Pike about his recent journey into Pawnee territory. Petitioned by two hundred of his militia to turn
back home, he halted his march and constructed a gallows. At that point, he
separated the petitioners from the rest of the unit, singled out the man who
had presented the demands, and had him flogged as an example to anyone
else who contemplated mutiny. This incident underscored Melgares' determination to avoid the embarrassment that had befallen Pedro Vial. Moreover, it indicated the degree to which he was prepared to carry out his duty
successfully.17
As quickly as their friendship began, it terminated with the escort's arrival in Chihuahua. There the two soldiers separated, never to encounter
one another again. Zebulon Pike spent the next month at military headquarters in Chihuahua before General Salcedo allowed him and his men to return home. Eventmilly promoted to the rank of brigadier general, Pike saw
action during the War of 1812 before he was fatally wounded while leading
an assault against the British at present-day Toronto. Facundo Melgares returned to Carrizal, perhaps somewhat enlightened by his unexpected encounter with the-foreigners.
Melgares soon found the opportunity to prove his loyalty to the Spanish empire in its defense against rebel insurrectionists. Shortly after Mexico's
declaration of independence in 1810, Melgares, promoted to the rank ofcaptain, led a royalist force from Carrizal against Father Miguel Hidalgo y
Costilla's troops under siege at Saltillo, Coahuila. After the rebel defeat at
Puente de Calderon near Guadalajara, Hidalgo and Ignacio Allende retreated
north to Coahuila. Sensing victory, General Felix Calleja and one of his ablest
officers, Colonel Alejo Garcia Conde, relentlessly pursued the rebel forces.
Pushed farther into northern Mexico, Allende sought refuge among rebel
supporters in Saltillo. Before reaching its protective walls, however, royalist forces under Captain Melgares had stormed the rebel stronghold only to
be repulsed. On March 21, 1811, after days of intense fighting, Calleja's
army, including Melgares' fatigued Carrizal regulars, defeated the insurgents
and arrested their leaders near Monclova, Coahuila. 18
Inasmuch as Hidalgo and Allende were captured within the jurisdiction of the Internal Provinces, the prisoners were marched in chains to stand
trial in Chihuahua. Forming the military escort were Manuel Salcedo, gov16. Jackson, Journals ofPike, 1:324.
17. Ibid., 1:406-07.
18. H. H. Bancroft, History of Mexico, 6 vols., (San Francisco: A. L. Bancroft &
Company Publishers, 1886-1888), 4:268-70; Michael C. Meyer and William Sherman,
. The Course ofMexican History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 290-91.
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ernor of Texas and nephew of the commandant general, and Captain
Melgares. While it is not clear whether Melgares participated in either the
trial or execution of Hidalgo or Allende, it is known that he sat on the military tribunal in judgement against other insurgents. In March 1811 Captain
Juan Bautista de Las Casas of San Antonio de Bexar led a revolt in support
of Hidalgo that was quickly suppressed. Las Casas was found guilty oftreason, shot in the back, and decapitated. Again the royalist captain, among
the five officers who invoked the death sentence, demonstrated his intolerance for all forms of rebellion against the crown. 19
.
Presumably, Melgares returned to his post on the northern frontier after
his briefcampaign in Coahuila. Not until 1817, when political events in Europe and the United States precipitated renewed threats to New Mexico,
does the name Facundo Melgares reappear on the active duty roster, this
time as commander of presidiaI troops in Santa Fe. In that year, the French
minister to the United States, Baron Guillaume Hyde de Neuville received
word that French exiles in New Orleans conspired to invade New Mexico.
Concerned that such an overt act of aggression would embarrass France,
the minister ordered an investigation. He assigned two former French army
officers, Louis DeMun and Edouard Lavaud to infiltrate Spanish territory
to assess the situation. After spending most of the summer in the field, the
two Frenchmen returned to Washington, where DeMun presumably compiled his detailed report on the defense capabilities of Spain) northernmost
province. It was this report, intercepted and forwarded to Viceroy Ruiz de
Apodaca the following year, that caused widespread distress among Span.
,,
ish authorities. 20
In the winter of 1817, New Mexico Governor Pedro Maria de'iAllande
received word from Apache informants that Americans, allied with the
Comanches, planned to invade the province. Spanish uneasiness was temporarily assuaged, however, when the reconnaissance forays of Corporal
Juan Lucero into the eastern borderlands failed to substantiate the rumor.
In January 1818Ambassador Onis warned of another impending American
invasion from Louisiana. The attack never came. Still, the viceroy urged
Allande to maintain strict surveillance along the border. 21
Apprised of the situation, recently appointed Commandant General
Alejo Garcia Conde, the hero of Saltillo, advised the governor that reinforcements from Chihuahua, under the command of Captain Melgares, were
en route to New Mexico. In July 1818 Melgares arrived in Santa Fe, with a
19. David J. Weber, The Mexican Frontier, 1821-1846: The American Southwest Under Mexico (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1982), 9.
20. During the War of 1812, Louis DeMun held the rank of lieutenant colonel in the
United States Army, Nuttall, "American Threat to New Mexico," 179-81; Nasatir says an
attack actually took place in Texas, but it failed, Borderland in Retreat, 152-53.
21. Nasatir, Borderland in Retreat, 151; Allande to alcaldes of Conchita, Alameda,
Albuquerque, and Belen, Santa Fe, March 2, 1818, frame 2714, reel 19, NMSRCA.
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detachment of veteran troops and a detailed strategy for the defense of the
city. He quickly assumed the position of acting governor of the province.
One month later, the king, with the endorsement of Viceroy Ruiz de Apodaca
and General Garcia Conde, appointed Melgares governor of New Mexico
and promoted him to the rank of lieutenant colonel. 22
Like other magistrates, Governor Melgares assumed his new administrative position with enthusiasm and an unfaltering devotion to duty. All civil
and military activity in New Mexico fell under his direction, subject to the
scrutiny of the commandant general in Chihuahua and the viceroy in Mexico
City. His responsibilities included routine administrative functions as well
as military supervision over defense needs throughout the province. Responsibility for the maintenance and training of regular presidial troops and civilian militia fell to Melgares. In this capacity, the governor's commitment
to protection against Indian hostility throughout his jurisdiction was imperative. In light of recent threats to security along the northern border,
Melgares assumed the added responsibility ofassuring vigilance against foreign intruders.
Scarcely a month in office, Governor Melgares exercised these obligations on two separate fronts. In early September, the governor received received reports from concerned a/cades that Navajos were raiding the northern villages. The governor issued a proclamation to all citizens of New
Mexico, calling for grain contributions and other supplies to aid forces stationed in Santa Fe. Melgares even made a personal donation of grain and
sheep "for the glory of the king and the nation." More disturbing was the
dearth of metal-always in short supply on the frontier-for making weapons. In his zeal to attend to defense needs, Melgares solicited donations of
metal, suggesting to one local priest that the church donate its bell to be
melted down and cast into munitions. 23
The governor's intent was clear. He was committed to a retaliatory campaign against the Navajos. Still, the presidio at Santa Fe numbered only 167
combat-ready troops. This shortage of soldiers left the governor no recourse
but to request help from Chihuahua and to rely heavily upon local militia to
carry out the punitive expedition. Melgares received praise from his superiors for his decisive action in response to Indian depredations. More important to the governor, General Garcia Conde transferred a detachment of sixty
armed regulars from the presidio of San Eleazario near EI Paso to aid in the
Navajo campaign. 24
22. Nuttall, "American Threat to New Mexico," 166.
23. Governor to alcaldes, Santa Fe, September 11, 1818, frame 2743, reel 19, NMSRCA;
Bolkan, "Facundo Melgares," 21.
24. Duty roster for the presidio of Santa Fe, January 1, 1818, frame 2707, reel 19;
Garcia Conde to Melgares September 15, 1818, frame 2774, reel 19; for a list of troops
dispatched from the San Eleazario Company in El Paso see, 28 October 1818, frame 2761,
reel 19, NMSRCA.
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By lat~ October, the governor was prepared to answer the Navajo threat.
He forwarded a dispatch to Captain Andres Gomez Sanudo, commander of
the second militia in Taos, instructing him to advance to the village of Jemez
and initiate the campaign no later than November 7. As with most of his
undertakings, Lieutenant Colonel Melgares pursued his war against the Navajos with grim resolve. He vowed to either subdue them, or drive them
into the California desert. He made no distinction between the Navajos and
the Apaches; in his judgment, both were a menace to the frontier. His military policy toward the Navajos was uncompromising, as evidenced in his
pledge to orchestrate their removal from New Mexico:
I do not believe that it is humanly possible for them [Navajos] to
escape ruination or flight to the other side ofthe Rio Colorado ... in
which case we shall be rid of our trouble-some neighbor. 25
His determination to punish the enemy notwithstanding, events in Mexico
City forced the governor to postpone the campaign.
Orders from his superiors in Mexico City, who by this time were in
possession of the anonymous notes forwarded from New Orleans, directed
the governor to fortify El Vado, Ojo Caliente, and Taos, three of New
Mexico's northernmost outposts. While the viceroy fully appreciated the
urgency resulting from the Navajo raids, the specter of foreign invasion deserved immediate attention. In fact, Ruiz de Apodaca voiced alarm that the
Americans were arming the Pawnees, whom he believed posed a more imminent danger to frontier security than the Navajos.
The French document emphasized three main points in its overall negative assessment of New Mexico's defensive capability. First, manpower distribution was pitifully low among all military installations. With only a handful of seasoned regulars scattered about the province, defense units consisted mainly of ill-equipped, poorly trained, and generally unpaid militia.
Second, New Mexico lacked the supplies to effectively compete with the
Americans for Indian allegiance. Therefore, local tribes could be easily consolidated against Spain in the event of an American invasion. Finally, government-sanctioned reconn~issancemissions proved generally ineffective.
DeMun concluded from these observations that a well-mounted expedition,
staged out of St. Louis, could readily overwhelm the province. The report
concluded with a designation of three routes into New Mexico view~d as
most suitable for a planned invasion: (1) Sangre de Cristo Pass (present La
Veta Pass in Colorado) was the most accessible, especially from the Huerfano
Valley; (2) Taos, easily attainable from a branch of the Red River; and (3) El
25. Melgares to Saiiudo, Santa Fe, October 30,1818, frame 2764, reel 19, NMSRCA;
Frank Reeve, "Navaho Foreign Affairs, 1795-1846. Part II, 1816-1824," Eleanor B. Adams
and John L. Kessell, eds., New Mexico Historical Review 46 (July 1971),232-33.
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Vado road, although possible, considered the poorest entry point because
of its frequency of travel. 26
While DeMun's observations were no doubt distressing to civil and
military authorities in Chihuahua and Mexico City, this was not the first
time the province had been singled out as a weak link in Spain's frontier
defenses. As early as 1812, Pedro Bautista de Pino, New Mexico's delegate
to the Spanish Cortes in Cadiz, underscored similar flaws in the province's
defense structure. At that time, Pino called for tIle expansion of all military
forces in addition to the establishment of five more presidios. Spanish officials, however, dismissed his request as unnecessary and too expensive. In
1817 Arsene Lacarrier Latour, another French visitor to the Internal Provinces, not only observed the same weaknesses but suggested improvements
to the captain-general in Havana. Again, these recommendations were ignored. Thus, in responding to the most current reports offoreign encroachment upon Spanish soil, it is not surprising that RUlz de Apodaca viewed
them with grave concern. 27
Two months prior to the viceroy's alert against foreign invasion, Facundo
Melgares had ordered a reconnaissance of the Arkansas Valley to substantiate rumors concerning American presence among the Pawnees. Melgares
derived his information from the sworn testimony of Corporal Jose Cayetano
Hernandez, a deserter from Carrizal captured by Indians and held prisoner
for several years. Once escaped, Hernandez reached safety in Taos and
warned military authorities about the impending danger. Hernandez testified that while he was held captive, an American army officer visited the
Pawnees to propose a plan of unification with the Kiowas in a cooperative
effort to invade Spanish territory. The officer, according to Hernandez, promised to arm the Indians in return for their pledge of loyalty. Both tribes were
to meet in the fall at La Agua Gerbidora (Manitou Springs, Colorado) to
finalize plans for the attack on New Mexico. While admitting he never actually saw any Americans, Hernandez judged more than three hundred Indians received arms and training. 28
26. Reeve, "Navaho Foreign Affairs, 230-33; Nuttall, "American Threat to New
Mexico," 163, 187-91; Thomas, "An Anonymous Description," 53.
27. Pedro Bautista de Pino's published commentary on conditions in New Mexico,
Exposici6n sucinta y senci/la de la provincia del Nuevo Mexico, is briefly summarized
in John Francis Bannon, The Spanish Borderlands Frontier, 1513-1821 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1974),219; Nuttall, "American Threat to New Mexico,"
163; Edwin H. Carpenter, Jr., "Arsene Lacarrier Latour," Hispanic American Historical
Review 18 (May 1938), 221-27; Ruiz, "For God and Country," 150-54.
28. Alfred B. Thomas and Frank Reeve do not agree on Hernandez's status as a deserter. Reeve argues Jose Cayetano Hernandez abandoned his post at Carrizal, "Navajo
Foreign Affairs," 230; Thomas claims Hernandez was medically discharged, then accused
of deserting his family in order to journey north to trade with the Pawnees, Alfred B.
Thomas, ed., "Documents Bearing Upon the Northern Frontier of New Mexico, 1818-1819,"
New Mexico Historical Review 4 (April 1929), 153-55.
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Though skeptical of this testimony, the governor nevertheless forwarded
. a copy of Hernandez' statement to General Garcia Conde. As an added precaution, Melgares dispatched Second Lieutenant Jose Maria de Arce north
for verification. Arce outfitted his party of 120 men and set out from Taos
on September 1, 1818. Shortly after their departure from northern New
Mexico, an additional force of more than four hundred men under the command of Juan de Dios Pefia, the alcalde mayor of Taos, joined the expedition. Arce's orders specified no engagement with the Americans, if encountered. Rather, he should observe American activity and report their movements back to the governor. Arce's men crossed the Sangre de Cristos into
the Huerfano Valley and proceeded to the Platte River. After a month of
reconnaissance, the officer returned to Santa Fe, reporting no sign of the
intruders. Perhaps more reassuring to Melgares was Arce's affirmation that
the Indians remained loyal to the crown, and would sound an advance warning of any danger. 29
Other intelligence, which Melgares gathered concurrently with Arce's
mission, confirmed the lieutenant's belief that the Indians were quiescent.
Before Arce's return to Santa Fe, Captain Safiudo advised that Pedro Martin,
a resident of Taos, recently returned from a visit to Kiowa country'where he
conferred with a Kiowa chief. The Indian leader denied any int.ention to
invade New Mexico, and pledged his willingness to remain on good terms
. with the Spanish. Another mission, that of Corporal Juan Lucero, who reconnoitered Comanche territory in November 1818, confirmed no evidence
of American activity. Indeed, Corporal Lucero returned to Santa Fe with
hundreds of Comanches to engage in trade. This gesture seeme~ a clear
indication to governor Melgares that the frontier was secure, and that
Hernandez' testimony was a complete fabrication. 3o
Secure in the belief that the frontier was in no immediate danger of
foreign attack, Governor Melgares submitted his informe to Mexico City.
Despite these assurances, Ruiz de Apodaca insisted that EI Vado, Ojo
Caliente, and Taos be fortified. While it is not certain why the viceroy re29. For a detailed translation of Arce's personal diary, see Thomas, "Documents," 15764; Juan de Dios Pella to Melgares, Taos, November 4, 1&1&, frame 276&, reel 19,
NMSRCA; Nuttall, "American Threat to New Mexico, " 174-77.
30. Salludo to Melgares, Taos, September 22,1&1&, frame 2749, reel 19; General Alejo
Garcia Conde sent Melgares the message informing him of Lucero's return and of his
findings. He advised the governor to make preparations to trade with the Comanche,
Garcia Conde to Melgares, Durango, November 9,1&1&, frame 2771, reel 19, NMSRCA;
John L. Kessell, Kiva, Cross. and Crown: The Pecos Indians and New Mexico, 15401840 (Washington D.C.: U. S. Department of the Interior, National Park Service, 1979),
436.
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mained skeptical, perhaps one possibility is suggested in DeMun's statement about the over all effectiveness of Spanish reconnaissance:
The governor of the province sends out from time to time parties to
reconnoiter the country and see what is going on there. But these
parties, where they go customarily never encounter enemies, (and)
are very negligent. 31
Melgares responded to the charges of negligence by insisting that while there
were some inadequacies, the French report was grossly exaggerated. The
governor added that his intelligence gathering efforts fell under the command ofcompetent officers. Some missions, in fact, were carried out "as far
as 100 leagues from Santa Fe" with no measurable results. He admitted,
however, that because he lacked veteran troops, he relied too heavily upon
local militia and Pueblo auxiliaries to defend the province.
For this reason, the governor requested reinforcements in the amount
of500 regulars-half of them infantry armed with muskets and bayonetsand pledged his commitment to fortify the northernmost outposts as directed. At addition, Melgares vowed to resume the Navajo campaign. He
proposed to accomplish this dual challenge by dividing his forces on two
fronts: 600 troops to defend Taos, and 400 to secure EI Vado against the
possibility of foreign attack. Meanwhile, a force of 800 men would be held
in reserve to address problems with the Navajos. In the governor's own
words, he was bent on "defending the province if any kind of enemy tries to
dispute our beneficent sovereign's undeniable right to it. "32
Apparently, the viceroy did not share Melgares' confidence in New
Mexico's state of military preparedness. Moreover, he questioned the
governor's assessment that an American attack was unlikely. For this reason, RUlz de Apodaca ordered the commandancy of the Internal Provinces
transferred from Chihuahua to Durango, so that he could scrutinize military
activities more closely. This general feeling of mistrust between the central
government in Mexico City and outlying provincial authorities mirrored the
internal problems that plagued Spain in the final days of its empire in
America. It can be argued that Facundo Melgares, not unlike many of his
contemporaries, fell victim to the bureaucratic system he fought so desperately to maintain.
31. Thomas, "Anonymous Description," 64-65.
32. Melgares once sent a reconnaissance mission as far as the Yellowstone Valley,
Wyoming, in his quest to substantiate the rumor of American encroachment, Alfred B.
Thomas, "The Yellowstone River, James Long and Spanish Reaction to American Intrusion into Spanish Dominion, 1818-1819," New MeXico Historical Review 4 (April 1929),
164-77; Reeve, "Navaho Foreign Affairs," 230; Nuttall, "American Threat in New
Mexico," 199-200.
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Facundo Melgares' signature (illustration courtesy Richard Salazar,
NMSRCA)
To be sure, Melgares did his utmost to fulfill his duty to the king of
Spain; his efforts, unfortunately, were all too often in vain. Once, .for example, his superiors directed him to place defensive fortifications along New
Mexico's northernmost mountain passes. The governor responded with a
detailed, cost-effective plan to construct temporary rather then permanent
installations. The viceroy forwarded the suggestions to his royal engineers,
who promptly rejected the structures because they were "unsuitable to the
terrain." The decision forced Melgares to halt construction and forward
detailed maps of the topography to Mexico City-l,500 miles away! When
the commandant general informed Melgares that he could not spare. the 500
troops he requested, the governor offered an alternative plan. If Garcia Conde
provided New Mexico with 4,500 pesos per month, plus the necessary equipment, the governor promised to personally reorganize and train the local
militia to combat effectiveness. Again, the viceroy rejected his proposaI,33
For all the anxiety the anonymous French report caused officials in
Mexico City, the American invasion never came. By February 1819 it appeared that the New Mexico frontier was secure except for the nagging recurrence of Navajo raiding. Melgares wasted no time in attending to the
problem of Indian unrest. Acting Commandant General Antonio Cordero,
however, instructed the governor to "make peace with the Indians by any
means practical."34 Melgares, in response, resumed the fighting on the pretext that the Hopi requested Spanish protection against their implacable foe.
The request, according to Melgares, was unprecedented; therefore, he responded enthusiastically in hope that his action would improve diplomatic
relations with the traditionally defiant Hopi.
33. Nuttall, "American Threat to New Mexico," 201-12.
34. Bolkan, "Facundo Melgares," 29.·
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When informed that Governor Melgares had taken up arms against the
Navajos, Viceroy Ruiz de Apodaca communicated his displeasure in a message to General Cordero:
Melgares has launched a campaign despite their [Navajos] peace proposal. I highly disapprove of his action in not accepting peace. Tell
him that I personally disapprove of his action and give him the necessary advice. 35
Despite this personal reprimand, Melgares pursued the campaign to successful termination, and concluded a formal peace agreement between Spain
and the Navajos on August 21, 1819.
With the frontier quiescent at last, Governor Melgares enjoyed relative
peace in New Mexico for the remaining three years of his term. His final
years as governor were marked by a seemingly unfaltering devotion to the
Spanish monarchy-even up to the moment of Mexican independence. Just
weeks after Agustin de Iturbide announced his celebrated Plan de 19uala,
the New Mexico magistrate issued a counter proclamation to all citizens of
the province to reaffirm their loyalty to the crown and the Constitution of
1812. Nevertheless, when issued a direct order from Commandant General
Garcia Conde to swear allegiance to the new republic, the staunch royalist
reluctantly complied. According to historian David J. Weber, on September
11, 1821, "near the ill-kept palace of the governors," citizens from Albuquerque and other ranching communities as well as neighboring Indian Pueblos "swore dutifully to uphold the new regime."36 Perhaps Melgares consented to do so more out of an obligation to obey a direct order than out of
a sense of patriotism for the new republic.
, Whatever his motive for swearing allegiance, the advent of the republic
marked the end ofMelgares' career as a colonial administrator. It appears,
however, that his final days as governor were not without controversy. On
July 5, 1822, citizens of the province brought charges againstthe governor
resulting in his dismissal from administrative office. He continued to serve
in a military capacity until October when his successor, Francisco Xavier
Chavez, assumed office. While the exact nature ofthe charges brought against
Melgares are not known, they may have stemmed from an incident involving a local priest from Abiquiu. The prelate attempted to transfer communal
property located in the pueblo to the Church. Melgares declared the transaction illegal. It certainly would not have been the first time a member of the
35. Reeve. "Navaho Foreign Affairs." 230-33.
36. Apparently, there was a brief resumption of hostilities between the Spanish and the
N'avajos during these three years; see, Melgares to Garcia Conde, Santa Fe, July 25, 1821,
frame 2994, reel 20; Melgares to the Citizens of New Mexico, Santa Fe, March 3,1821,
frame 2969, reel 20, NMSRCA; David J. Weber, "An Unforgettable Day: Facundo Melgares
on Independence," New Mexico Historical Review 48 (January 1973),34; Garcia Conde
to Melgares, Durango, September 11,1821, frame 2970, reel 20, NMSRCA; Weber, The
Mexican Frontier, 5.
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clergy exerted pressure for the removal of an uncooperative civil official. It
should be noted, however, that in August 1823 the ex-governor was exonerated of all charges brought against him. 37
Despite the personal controversy that clouded his tenure, the record
validates Melgares as an effective military leader and loyal civil administrator. He acc~pted, without question, the duties of his office and carried them
out to the fullest capacity. In the face offoreign invasion, don Facundo marshaled all of the limited resources at his disposal to meet the challenge that
never materialized. Ifthe governor deserved a reprimand from his superiors, it should have been for his zealous determination to bring the Navajos
to the peace table, and not for dereliction of duty.
Even his adversarial attitude toward Indians as a soldier gave way to
just and equal treatment as an civil administrator. During his tenure as governor, Melgares viewed the law regarding the creation of municipal governments as extending to the Pueblo Indians. When the Constitution of 1812
declared all residents of the New World citizens, Melgares interpreted this
to apply to the Pueblo people. Colonial expert, Marc Simmons, noted that
the governor decreed the Pueblo Indians should be regarded "as Spaniards
in all things, exercising especially their rights to vote and to stand as candidates for office." By late 1820 most of the Pueblos had installed formal
municipal governments. 38
It might be said ofMelgares that his only obvious shortcoming was ~hat
of being a royalist in transition, caught at the crossroads of empire. It was
not within his power-or any other frontier commander-;-to alter the course
of a decaying monarchy, regardless of his unwavering loyalty. History seems
to indicate that Governor Melgares inherited the deficiencies cited in the
DeMun report. Yet, he worked tirelessly to overcome them and avert a foreign takeover. His principal obligation to the crown and to the citizens of
New Mexico was to maintain peace; to that end he was successful. While it
cannot be denied that his military exploits were blemished by personal controversy as an administrator, Melgares remained loyal to the Spanish cause,
even in its final hour. Was his decision in 1821 to challenge the new political
order grounded in deep-rooted political conviction or did it stem from selfish motivation? As it now stands, we must conclude that he addressed the
myriad problems inherent in a transitional government. In the end, Facundo
Melgares, the last Spanish governor of New Mexico, was one of the many
victims of an empire in decline.
37. Surveyor General Records, New Mexico Land Grants, Report 29, File 63, reel 16,
University of New Mexico, Zimmerman Library, Special Collections; Lansing Bartlett
Bloom, "New Mexico under Mexican Administration, 1821-1846," Old Santa Fe 1 (October 1913), 145-53.
38. Population figures for the province indicate an increase from 35,840 in 1819 to
slightly more than 40,000 people in 1822, Melgares' last year as governor; Census Repor.t, frame 2950, ree120, NMSRCA; Marc Simrrions, Spanish Government in New Mexico
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990),212-13.
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